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Does Explaining Social Behavior Require Multiple Memory Systems? 
Amodio [1] argues that social cognition research has for many decades relied on 
imprecise dual-process models that build on questionable assumptions about how people learn 
and represent information. He presents an alternative framework for explaining social behavior as 
the product of multiple dissociable memory systems, based on the idea that cognitive 
neuroscience has revealed evidence for the existence of separate systems underlying distinct 
forms of learning and memory.  
Although we applaud Amodio’s attempt to build bridges between social cognition, 
learning psychology, and neuroscience, we believe that his interactive memory systems model 
rests on shaky grounds. In our view, the most significant limitation is the idea that behavioral 
dissociations provide strong evidence for multiple memory systems with functionally distinct 
learning mechanisms. A major problem with this idea is that behavioral dissociations can arise 
from processes during the retrieval and use of stored information, which does not require any 
assumptions about distinct memory systems or distinct forms of learning. For example, in 
contrast to Amodio’s argument that double dissociations between implicit evaluative bias and 
implicit stereotypical bias in the prediction of different forms of discriminatory behavior provide 
evidence for distinct memory systems [2], the observed dissociation may simply indicate that 
people retrieve and use different kinds of information when faced with different kinds of 
behavioral decisions (e.g., how close to sit next to a stranger vs. whom to choose as a partner for 
a trivia task). Such differences in the retrieval and use of stored information do not imply that 
different types of information (e.g., evaluative vs. stereotypical) are stored in distinct memory 
systems. 
The same concern applies to dissociations involving neural structures. For example, in 
instrumental learning tasks, Parkinson’s disease patients with striatal dysfunction have been 
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found to verbally report the correct reward contingencies without making reward-congruent 
choices, whereas patients with hippocampal lesions show the reversed impairment [3]. Amodio 
interprets such findings as evidence for independent representations of conceptual and 
instrumental knowledge arising from distinct forms of learning [1]. However, such dissociations 
can also arise from differences in retrieval processes drawing upon a single memory system. In 
line with this concern, it has been argued that dissociations in the behavior of Parkinson’s disease 
and hippocampal lesion patients reflect differences in the expression of a single type of 
representation in two tasks that require different ways of retrieving these representations [4]. 
Theoretical ambiguities like these have led to increased skepticism about the idea that cognitive 
neuroscience “reveals” multiple memory systems that are each associated with different neural 
substrates [5].  
Our arguments are also applicable to other dissociations beyond the ones discussed by 
Amodio. For example, several studies have found that implicit (i.e., spontaneous) evaluations 
reflect the mere co-occurrence of stimuli regardless of their relation, whereas explicit (i.e., 
deliberate) evaluations are sensitive to the particular relation of the co-occurring stimuli [6]. 
Based on extant dual-process theories, such findings have been interpreted as evidence for 
distinct learning mechanisms underlying implicit and explicit evaluations: automatic formation of 
associative links between co-occurring events (e.g., associative link between A and B) and 
controlled generation and truth assessment of mental propositions about the relation between co-
occurring events (e.g., A prevents B). However, the observed dissociation may also reflect 
differences in the retrieval of stored propositional information, given that (a) implicit and explicit 
evaluations differ in terms of their relative speed and (b) fast evaluations are more likely affected 
by incomplete retrieval of stored information (e.g., retrieval of A is related to B rather than A 
prevents B) [7]. Thus, different from the argument that the observed dissociation provides 
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evidence for functionally distinct learning mechanisms, it can be explained by retrieval-related 
processes without any assumptions about distinct learning mechanisms or distinct memory 
systems. 
When exploring complexity in the retrieval and use of stored information, social cognition 
research can draw upon an extensive literature in diverse fields of psychology and neuroscience. 
For example, a wide range of phenomena such as categorization, task switching, recognition, 
recall, contingency learning, feature binding, stimulus-response binding, negative priming, and 
social judgment can be accounted for by episodic memory models that assume a single (episodic) 
memory system that is operated upon by context-dependent similarity-based retrieval 
mechanisms [8-10]. Likewise, many complexities of Pavlovian conditioning can be accounted for 
by assuming a comparator mechanism that compares multiple simple associations at the time of 
performance [11]. Finally, cognitive neuroscience has seen a surge in the popularity of predictive 
coding models, which explain a wide range of behavioral findings in terms of highly flexible 
processes involved in the retrieval and expression of low-level predictions [12]. Social cognition 
researchers are only beginning to exploit the huge potential that these retrieval-based approaches 
offer. Following this shift towards explaining behavioral complexity at the level of retrieval 
might be a more promising way forward for social cognition than a proliferation of learning and 
memory systems. 
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